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dimensions of the financial sector, namely, size and efficiency. Evidence suggests that 
migrant remittances contribute to increasing the size and efficiency of the financial 
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size and efficiency through the government ownership of banks channel. While the 
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1.  Introduction 
Migrant remittances into the developing economies  have increased  by 526%  from 
US$ 31,058 million to US$ 194,349 over the 1990-2005 period (World Bank 2009) 
accounting for the second largest source of international inflows next to foreign direct 
investment. A financial system channels funds from savers to borrowers, thereby 
playing a vital role in an economy’s growth process. Migrant remittances can promote 
financial development in the recipient countries by increasing the volume of deposits 
with financial institutions. By increasing the availability of credit and banking 
services to the public such as savings accounts and small scale loans, remittances can 
also bring a larger proportion of a country’s ‘unbanked’ population in contact with the 
formal financial system (IMF 2005). Remittance inflows into the low and middle 
income economies have been found to reduce poverty (Adams and Page 2003), 
promote economic growth (Mundaca 2009), provide capital for micro enterprises 
(Woodruff and Zenteno 2001), reduce output volatility (Chami et al. 2009) and lead 
to exchange appreciation (Rajan and Subramanian 2005,  and Lopez, Molina and 
Bussolo 2007). Barajas et al. (2009) however, find no evidence of a relation between 
workers’ remittances and economic growth, while Abih et al. (2008) show that 
remittance inflows can lead to a decline in institutional quality. The relation between 
remittances and the financial sector has been examined in the studies of Giuliano and 
Ruiz-Arranz (2009), Aggarwal, Demirguc-Kunt and Martinez Peria (2006), Orozco 
and Fedewa (2005), Munduca (2009), Gupta, Pattillo and Wagh (2009) among others. 
Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2009) conclude that remittances can promote economic 
growth in the developing economies by enhancing financial sector development, 
particularly in financially less developed economies. Aggrawal et al. (2006) find that 
migrant remittances lead to financial sector development in the developing economies 
by leading to increases in the aggregate volume of deposits and credit intermediated 
by the banking sector. In a case study of nine financial institutions in South America, 
Orozco and Fedewa (2005) show that financial institutions’ distribution of transfers, 
and financial services provided depend on the resources of the institution and its 
existing presence in the community. Mundaca using a panel dataset from Latin 
America shows that remittances can further promote economic growth in economies 
with well developed financial markets. Modelling the entry of banks into the 
remittance market, Alberola and Salvado (2006) observe that banks as opposed to 
smaller money transmitter operators, have the ability to offer lower remittance 
transmission fees thereby increasing the volume of remittances into recipient 
countries. Freund and Spatafora (2008) on the other hand, argue that formal 
transmission channels such as banks are more expensive compared to informal 
transmission channels. In a panel dataset covering 104 countries, they show that 
remittances are transmitted through formal channels in countries which have well 
developed financial systems. The informal sector is large in countries in which 
exchange rate spreads are large, in particular, Sub-Saharan Africa, Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia. Examining the effect of remittances on poverty and financial 
development in Sub-Saharan Africa, Gupta et al. (2009) find that remittances have a 
positive effect on both poverty and financial development. Acosta et al (2009) 
investigating the effects of remittances on the exchange rate on 109 developing and 
transition economies find that the upward pressure on exchange rates brought about 
by the increase in remittances, are lower in countries with well developed financial 
markets. 
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This study is closely related to the literature that investigates the relation between 
remittance flows and the financial sector. The studies hereto have explored the effects 
of remittance inflows on financial sector size. The majority of studies undertaken on 
the impact of remittances on financial sector size as measured by the ratio of 
deposits/GDP, private credit/GDP and liquid assets/GDP, show that migrant 
remittances have a positive influence on financial sector size. This study differs from 
the previous literature in that it not only examines the effect of migrant remittances on  
financial sector size, but also efficiency. In addition, the present study investigates if 
the impact of remittances on financial sector size and efficiency are conditional on the 
degree of government ownership of banks. The impact of remittance inflows on 
financial sector efficiency as measured by overhead costs and net interest margins is 
unknown. If remittances lead to an increase in efficiency this would benefit the public 
due to reduced overhead costs and net interest margins. Increases in overhead costs 
and net interest margins on the other hand, would lead a fall in financial sector 
efficiency. A related issue that has not been explored is, the role played by 
government owned banks, in determining the magnitude and efficiency of 
remittances. In the developing economies, the government plays a major role in 
setting up banks in rural areas providing access to finance. The political view argues 
that the government, by pursuing its own political objectives is subject to conflicting 
interests which can lead to inefficient outcomes, primarily in economies with weak 
property rights. This could lead to increased interest margins and overhead costs. The 
development view on the other hand, argues that the government can help overcome 
market failures and promote development through lower costs and increased access to 
finance, particularly in the developing economies. Government ownership can also 
play an important role in retaining savings within a financial system where regulation 
is not of high quality (Shortland 2009). Consequently the contribution of this study is 
threefold: one, to investigate the effects of migrant remittances on financial sector 
size; two, to examine the effect of remittances on financial sector efficiency; and 
three, to explore the relation between migrant remittances and financial sector 
development through the government ownership of banks channel. 
 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 examines some country 
characteristics.  Section 3 states the hypotheses.  Section 4 describes the data and 
estimation methodology.  Section 5 presents the empirical results, and conclusions are 
summarised in Section 6. 
 
2.    Country Characteristics 
Figures 1 and 2 show remittance receipts  for the countries in the sample in US $ 
million and as a percentage of GDP respectively, for 2005. The largest five recipients 
of remittance inflows in the sample in absolute terms are India (US $23,725 million), 
China (US $22,492 million) Mexico (US $21,772 million), the Philippines (US 
$13,566 million) and Guatemala (US $8180 million). The largest five recipients of 
remittance inflows as a percentage of GDP are: Tonga (44%), Moldova (28%), 
Guyana (27%), Guatemala (26%) and Haiti (23%). Figure 3 plots the relation between 
deposit money bank assets to GDP and the log of  migrant remittances to GDP. This 
preliminary analysis suggests  a positive relationship between the two variables.  
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Figure 1: Remittance Inflows 2005 (US$ Million)
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Figure 2: Remittance Inflow s as % of GDP 2005
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Figure 3: Deposit Money Bank Assets/GDP and Remittances to GDP Average 
1990-2005 
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Note:  The regression represented by the fitted line reports a coefficient of 0.021 (Robust SE = 0.011),  
N = 69,  R2 = 0.03 from a regression of log remittances/GDP on deposit money bank assets/GDP.   
 
 
[Table 1, about here] 
Table 1 groups the countries by the level of government ownership of banks. The 
overall mean for the government ownership of banks for all countries in the sample is 
50%, suggesting that the government ownership of banks in general, is relatively 
high. Hence, countries in which the government owns over 50% (above the mean) of 
bank assets are classified as high government bank ownership countries and those in 
which the government owns less than 50% (below the mean), low government bank 
ownership countries. An examination of the averages for the two groups- high and 
low government ownership - indicate that the ratio of deposits, liquid liabilities and 
private credit to GDP are higher in the low government ownership group. The low 
government ownership group has a lower net interest margin (a mean of 0.057 as 
opposed to 0.066 for the high state ownership group), while overhead costs are lower 
in the high government ownership group (a mean of 0.046 as opposed to 0.057 for the 
low government ownership group). Note that migrant remittances in absolute terms 
are higher in the high government bank ownership group while migrant remittances to 
GDP are higher in the low government bank ownership group. Hence, a question that 
arises at this point is, do migrant remittances lead to increases in financial sector 
development in countries with high or low bank ownership? 
 
 
3.  Hypothesis 
This study tests the hypotheses that: 
1)  Migrant remittances influence the size of the financial sector 
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2)  Migrant remittances influence the efficiency of the financial sector. 
3)  Despite the fact that remittances can affect the financial sector through a number 
of channels, this study then goes on to investigate if remittances influence the 
financial sector through the government ownership of banks channel. To test this 
hypothesis, the remittance variable is interacted with the government ownership of 
banks. This interaction term will show the degree to which the prevalence of state 
owned banks matter for the influence of remittances on financial sector development. 
A negative interaction term on the financial sector size equations would indicate that 
remittances lead to increases in financial sector size in countries with a low 
government ownership of banks while a positive interaction term would imply that 
remittances lead to increases in financial sector size in countries with a high 
government ownership of banks. A negative interaction term on the financial sector 
efficiency equations would imply that remittances lead to a fall in overhead costs and 
net interest margins in countries with a high government ownership of banks, and a 
positive interaction term that remittances lead to a fall in overhead costs and net 
interest margins in countries with a low government ownership of banks.  
 
Migrant Remittances, Government Ownership and the Size and Efficiency of the 
Financial Sector 
Remittances are an important, and sometimes, the only means of access to financial 
services by households in low income economies. Remittances can enable low income 
households to accumulate funds which can be used to finance future consumption or 
investment. These funds can also be used to smooth consumption in the event of 
unexpected fluctuations in income (Yang and Choi 2007). Remittances can therefore 
help low income households to minimise the impact of negative shocks thus reducing 
their vulnerability. The accumulation of savings in turn, can create the opportunity for 
lending these funds back into the community. The availability of credit can enable the 
public to diversify their portfolios, and gain access to borrowing. Consequently, in the 
developing economies, remittances can play an important role in not only providing 
financial access to the rural poor, but also serve as an important means of  bringing a 
large proportion of those using informal channels into the mainstream. Thus, 
remittances have been found to have a positive impact on financial sector size 
(Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz 2009, Aggarwal et al. 2006, Orozco and Fedewa 2005, 
Gupta et al. 2009). Increasing financial access by improving liquidity, can in turn lead 
to lower transactions costs and net interest margins. Migrant remittances can permit 
banks to further subsidise loans which does not necessarily imply increased 
efficiency, but nonetheless, will lead to a fall in net interest margins. Similarly, 
remittances can provide banks with access to funds that can contribute to a fall in 
overhead costs. If on the other hand, remittances allow banks to earn monopolistic 
profits, this will lead to increases in net interest margins and overhead costs. A 
number of measures are being taken by the governments of the developing economies 
to increase financial inclusion. In Uganda for example, banks now have centralised 
databases and money can be sent to any part of the country within the same branch 
network in seconds at no, or minimal cost. Banks have in addition, introduced 
improved infrastructure and various financial literacy programmes (East African 
2009). A number of countries in South America, Asia and Africa, have introduced 
mobile phone banking. “With new technology and computerisation of banking 
operations, new remittance products have been introduced in the market, which have 
increased the speed, cost-effectiveness and efficiency of the payments and settlement 
system. These include the National Electronic Funds Transfer (NEFT), Electronic 
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Clearing System (ECS), Real Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) and ongoing endeavour 
at cheque truncation system leading to a national payment and settlement system” 
(Mohapatra 2009). These measures can be expected to increase access to finance and 
lower overhead costs and net interest margins. Despite the introduction of these 
measures by the government to increase banking outreach, a large proportion of the 
population in the middle and particularly low income economies still remain 
unbanked. Therefore the question of whether the size and efficiency of a financial 
sector is higher in economies with a high or low prevalence of government owned 
banks is one that needs to be investigated. 
 
4. Data and Estimation Methodology 
4.1       Data 
The study uses annual data over the 1990-2007 period for 98 countries. See Data 
Appendix for list of countries, data sources and explanation. The sample constitutes a 
representative cross section of the regions covering Eastern Europe and Central Asia, 
the Middle East and North Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, East Asia and 
the Pacific, South Asia and Africa. The high income OECD countries are excluded 
from the analysis as the channels through which remittance inflows influence the 
financial sector in these economies are likely to be different from other regions. It is 
estimated that a large proportion of remittance flows are transmitted through informal 
channels. A limitation of the study therefore, is that it is only able to capture official 
flows that are transmitted through formal channels1. The dependent variables in the 
study are the financial sector size and efficiency variables. Financial sector size is 
measured by: (1) the ratio of deposit banks assets to GDP (2) liquid assets to GDP (3) 
domestic credit by deposit banks and other financial institutions to the private sector 
as a ratio of GDP. The provision of credit by the banking sector to the private sector is 
also an indicator of the degree of activity of financial intermediaries. Financial sector 
efficiency is measured by (1) the value of banks’ net interest margin to total assets, 
and (2) banks’ overhead costs to total assets. Increased competition in the financial 
sector should reduce overhead costs and interest margins. Therefore, if these measures 
are low it would imply increased efficiency and vice versa. These financial sector 
indicators are used by Aggarawal, Demirguc-Kunt and Martinez Peria (2006), Beck, 
Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2003), among others.  
 
The main independent variable in the study is the ratio of migrant remittances to 
GDP. These are formal remittances that are recorded in the National Accounts.  
Remittances are defined as the addition of migrant remittances and compensation of 
employees. These include current transfers by migrant workers and wages and salaries 
earned by non resident workers. Other independent variables in the preliminary  
estimation include, the initial level of per capita income to capture the level of 
development of a country, openness and inflation variables based upon the previous 
literature. Studies have shown that current and capital account liberalisation have a 
favourable impact on financial sector development (see Chinn and Ito 2002, Aggarwal 
et al. 2006). The ratio of exports to GDP, the ratio of foreign direct investment to 
GDP and a dummy variable for the exchange rate regime are used to capture the 
degree of openness of an economy. If a country follows some form of fixed/managed/ 
crawling peg exchange rate regime, a dummy variable of one is assigned to it and zero 
                                                 
1 A study by Freund and Spatafora (2005) empirically estimate informal remittance flows.  According 
to them, informal remittance flows account for about 35%-75% of official remittances to developing 
economies. 
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if the currency is allowed to float independently. Inflation can discourage financial 
intermediation (see Aggarwal et al. 2006) and also act as a proxy for uncertainty and 
risk (see Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz 2009). Therefore inflation is used an explanatory 
variable in the empirical estimation that follows.  
 
Additional control variables are used in the estimation that follows, to test the 
robustness of the results to the choice of variables. A well developed financial system 
requires a proper legal and regulatory framework. La Porta et al.(1997) show that 
countries in which  legal systems provide proper protection to investors against 
expropriation by entrepreneurs, are likely to have larger and better developed 
financial markets. They argue that countries with English Common law origin provide 
the highest investor protection while countries with French law origin provide 
investors with the least protection. Hence, a dummy variable is created for French 
legal origin. This dummy variable takes on a value of one for French legal origin and 
zero otherwise. As migration is likely to be higher from conflict ridden states, a 
dummy variable of one is assigned if a country experienced a conflict during the 
period under study, that is, 1990-2007, and zero otherwise. The level of financial 
literacy of a society can positively impact upon the volume of remittances transmitted 
through formal channels and thereby on financial sector development. Secondary 
school enrolment is used as a proxy for the level of financial literacy. A well 
developed financial system also requires to be accompanied by the necessary 
infrastructure and technological know-how. This is captured by the ratio of gross 
domestic fixed capital formation to GDP. As increased government expenditure can 
increase bank concentration and reduce competitiveness by crowding out private 
sector investment expenditure, the share of public consumption to GDP is also 
considered. Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2003) show that increased 
ethnic/religious fractionalisation can impede financial sector development. Culture is 
found to be associated with financial sector development also in Stultz and 
Williamson (2003). Therefore the religious fractionalisation measure of (Alesina et al. 
2003) is employed to capture culture.      
 
To  investigate the hypothesis that remittances affect the financial sector through the 
government ownership of banks channel, the ratio of migrant remittances to GDP is 
interacted with the government ownership of banks from LaPorta, Lopez-De-Sinales 
and Shleifer (2002) and Barth, Caprio and Levine (2001)2. 
 
4.2   Estimation Methods 
The study uses both pooled OLS and system GMM methods to estimate the influence 
of remittances on the financial sector.  
The following model forms the basis of the preliminary OLS estimation:  
Fii = aRit +  xit β +  υit                  (1) 
where Fit  is the financial sector variable for country i in period t. Rit  is the remittance 
variable for country i in period t All control variables mentioned in Section 4 are 
captured by the vector xit.  υi  is a random error term that captures all other variables.  
 
                                                 
2 Note that in La Porta et al. (2001) the government ownership of banks is defined as the ownership of 
deposits by the government in the 10 largest commercial and development banks.  In Barth et al. (2001) 
the government ownership of banks is defined as the ownership of deposits by the government in the 5 
largest banks. 
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In order to exploit the time series dimension of the data and individual country 
specific effects correcting for any endogeneity bias in the explanatory variables, the 
Arellano-Bover (1995)-Blundell Bond (1998) system GMM method is used. Here the  
levels equation (2) is combined with a first difference equation (3). The equation in 
levels (2), is instrumented with lagged first differences of the variables, while the 
equation in first differences, (3), is instrumented with lagged levels of the variables. 
Blundell and Bond (1998) show that when there are time-invariant regressors, the 
lagged levels of the explanatory variables can be weak instruments for the variables in 
differences. The system GMM method enables estimating the equation not only in 
first differences but also in levels permitting the inclusion of time invariant regressors 
which would disappear in difference GMM (Roodman 2006).  
Fit =  γFit-1 + aRit +  xit β + μi + ηi +  υit         (2) 
Fit – Fit-1  =  γ(Fit-1  - Fii-2) + a(Rit – Rii-1) +  β( xit − xit-1)  + μi+  ηi +  (υit - υit-1)       (3) 
The variable definitions are the same as for equation (1) with the lagged values of the 
variables now entering the equations and μi representing a country specific effect and 
ηi, a fixed time effect. The GMM estimator is based on the assumption that the error 
terms are not serially correlated and that the explanatory variables are weakly 
exogenous or not correlated with future realizations of the error terms under which the 
following moment condition holds for the first difference estimator: 
E[Fit-s (υit - υit-1)]= 0;  E[Rit-s (υit - υit-1)]= 0;    E[xit-s (υit - υit-1)]= 0    where i = 1…..n, 
t = 3….T   and s≥ 2. 
and as mentioned above the levels equation is instrumented with lagged first 
differences of the variables which leads to the additional moments condition: 
E[ΔFit-s (μi + υit )] = 0; E[ΔRit-s (μi + υit )] = 0; E[Δxit -s (μi + υit )] = 0 for s =1. 
Two diagnostic tests are carried out on the system GMM estimates. The Hansen  test 
for over-identifying restrictions under which the null hypothesis is that the 
instruments are not correlated with the residuals. The second is the Arellano-Bond test 
for second order correlation in the first differenced residuals. 
 
5.     Empirical Estimation 
OLS Estimation 
 
Table 2 presents OLS results for the model. The dependent variable in column (1) is 
Deposit Money Bank Assets/GDP, column (2) Private Sector Credit/GDP, column (3) 
liquid assets/GDP, column (4) overhead costs and column (5) net interest margin. 
Estimation is initially carried out with migrant remittances to GDP, the level of per 
capita income, the ratio of exports to GDP, FDI to GDP, and an exchange rate dummy 
variable, all of which capture the degree of openness of an economy and the rate of 
inflation as explanatory variables.  
[Table 2, about here] 
The results indicate that migrant remittances have a positive and significant impact on 
the financial sector size variables. For example, column (1) indicates that a 1% 
increase in remittances lead to a 0.04% increase bank deposits and column (2) that a 
1% increase in remittances lead to a 0.03% increase in private credit to GDP. An 
increase in remittances lead to a fall in overhead costs and net interest margins. In 
Column (4), a 1% increase in remittances lead to a 0.003% decrease in overhead costs 
and in column (5), a 0.004% decrease in the net interest margin. The estimates on per 
capita income are statistically significant and suggest that a higher per capita income 
is associated with an increase in the financial sector size variables and lower overhead 
costs and net interest margins. The coefficients on the ratio of exports to GDP is 
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statistically significant in all columns indicating that greater openness contributes to 
an increase in financial sector size and rise in efficiency. Foreign direct investment is 
statistically significant in columns (2)-(5). The results suggest that foreign direct 
investment has a positive effect on financial sector size, also that it contributes to 
reducing overhead costs and net interest margins. Inflation has a significant negative 
impact on both financial sector size and efficiency. The estimates on the exchange 
rate variables are statistically  significant in columns (1), (3) and (5) suggesting that 
exchange controls exert a negative effect on the volume of deposits and liquid assets 
to GDP and lead to an increase in the net interest margin.  
 
 
Table 3 estimates the equations with additional control variables mentioned in Section 
4. Including the secondary school enrolment ratio reduces the sample size 
significantly however.  
[Table 3, about here] 
As before, the variable of interest, migrant remittances, have a significant positive 
impact on both financial sector size and efficiency. Columns (1), (2) and (3) indicate 
that a 1%  increase in migrant remittances will lead to a 0.04%  increase deposit 
money bank assets/GDP, a 0.03% increase in credit/ GDP and a 0.02% increase in 
liquid assets/GDP respectively. The French legal origin dummy variable has a 
significant negative impact on the size and efficiency of the financial sector in all 
columns. Openness as measured by exports to GDP has statistically significant 
positive impact on financial sector size and efficiency. FDI is statistically significant 
only in equation (3). Inflation exerts a significant negative effect on the financial 
sector size and efficiency variables. In column (1) for instance, a 1% increase in the 
rate of inflation will lead to a 0.08% fall in deposit bank assets. The coefficient on the 
exchange rate dummy variable is statistically significant in all equations suggesting 
that exchange rate controls lead to a fall in the financial sector size variables and a rise 
in overhead costs and net interest margins. The coefficients on secondary schooling 
are statistically significant exerting positive impact on financial sector size and 
efficiency. The coefficients on government consumption are statistically significant in 
equations (3) and (4) suggesting that increases in government consumption are 
associated with increases in bank liquid assets and a rise in overhead costs. Population 
growth has a significant positive effect on financial sector size and also leads to an 
increase in the net interest margin. Gross domestic capital formation is statistically 
significant in equation (4) and the coefficients on religious fractionalisation in 
equations (1), (2) and (5). The results suggest that increased religious fractionalisation 
leads to a fall in the ratio of bank deposits/GDP and the volume of credit disbursed to 
the private sector. Religious fractionalisation also leads to a rise in the net interest 
margin. The conflict dummy variable is significant in all columns except for column 
(2). An increase in conflict reduces the volume of deposits and the liquid assets held 
by banks. The results suggest that conflict also causes overhead costs and net interest 
margins to fall.  
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GMM Estimation 
Table 4 replicates the preliminary regressions in Table 2 using system GMM3. The 
one-step GMM estimator is used in the present study. This yields standard errors that 
are not only asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity but have also been found to 
be more reliable for finite sample estimation (see Blundell and Bond 1998, Bond, 
Hoeffler, Temple 2001). 
[Table 4, about here] 
The results for the GMM estimation are consistent with those obtained under OLS 
estimation in Table 2. The remittance variables continue to be highly statistically 
significant. Exports to GDP is significant  in all columns except for column (4) and  
FDI is significant in  columns (2) and (4). Exchange rate controls have a significant 
negative impact on deposit money bank assets and private credit, and also lead to 
increases in overhead costs. Inflation has a significant negative impact on financial 
sector size and efficiency. The lagged values of the dependent variables are all 
statistically significant reflecting a high degree of persistency in the variables. The 
Sargan test for over-identifying restrictions where the null hypothesis is that the 
instruments are uncorrelated with the residuals, and the Arellano-Bond test for second 
order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, confirm that the moments 
conditions cannot be rejected. 
 
Table 5 replicates the regressions carried out in Table 3 with additional control 
variables using system GMM. The results confirm the OLS findings that remittances 
have a positive impact on financial sector development. French legal origin has a 
negative influence on financial sector size and efficiency as before.  Similarly, exports 
have a significant positive effect on the financial sector size variables and inflation 
and exchange rate controls a negative impact on financial sector development.  
Secondary schooling is statistically significant in columns (1), (3) and (4) and gross 
domestic capital formation in columns (1), (2) and (4) suggesting the importance of 
literacy and infrastructure for financial sector development. There is some evidence of 
a negative effect of religious fractionalisation on financial sector development. 
Conflict has a negative impact on financial sector size and leads to a fall in the net 
interest margin and overhead costs. 
[Table 5, about here] 
 
Government Ownership, Financial Sector Development and Migrant 
Remittances 
Table 6 reports results for the influence of remittances on the financial sector through 
the government ownership channel. System GMM is used as this method best 
addresses the possible endogeneity of migrant remittances and also accounts for the 
effect of time invariant or very slowly changing government ownership of banks.    
[Table 6, about here] 
The overall results are consistent with those above with remittances leading to 
increases in financial sector size and efficiency. The interaction terms on the 
government ownership of banks x migrant remittances are statistically significant in 
equations (1), (2) (4) and (5). The interaction terms in columns (1) and (2) suggest 
that remittances lead to increases in the volume of deposits and private credit in 
                                                 
3 Although the two-step estimator is more efficient for system GMM, Monte Carlo studies show that 
the two-step GMM estimator converges to its asymptotic distribution very slowly. In finite samples, the 
asymptotic standard errors associated with the two-step GMM estimators can be downward biased and 
thus be an unreliable measure for inference (see Bond, Hoeffler and Temple (2001). 
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countries with low government bank ownership and the interaction terms in columns 
(4) and (5) suggest that remittances lead to a fall in overhead costs and net interest 
margins in countries with high government bank ownership.   
 
The Model Disaggregated by Government Ownership of Banks 
Next, the baseline model is re-estimated by dividing the sample into two groups -low 
and high government ownership of banks (according to the mean level of the 
government ownership of banks). This is to compare how remittances influence 
financial sector development in these two groups.  The results are reported in Table 7. 
[Table 7, about here] 
The results are consistent with those obtained above in Table 6. The variable of 
interest, migrant remittances, have a positive significant impact on deposit money 
bank assets, private credit and liquid assets to GDP in the low government bank 
ownership group. Remittances also have a positive significant impact on deposit 
money bank assets and private credit in the high government bank ownership group. 
However, the coefficients on the remittance variables in equations (1)-(3) are higher 
for the low government bank ownership group suggesting that remittances have a 
larger positive impact on the financial sector size variables in this group. For example, 
column (1) suggests that a 1% increase in remittances will lead to a 0.03% increase in 
deposits in the low government bank ownership group as opposed to a 0.02% increase 
in deposits in the high government bank ownership group. The remittance coefficients 
in equations (4) and (5) suggest that remittances lead to increased efficiency, or, a 
larger fall in overhead costs and net interest margins in the high government bank 
ownership group. The remittance coefficients in columns (4) and (5) are statistically  
significant for the high government ownership group, however, not statistically 
significant for the low government ownership group. These results are consistent with 
those obtained in Table 6 above. An examination of the other variables show that per 
capita income has a positive impact on the size and efficiency of the financial sector 
in both groups.  An increase in the ratio of exports to GDP exerts a positive 
significant impact on the financial sector size variables and a fall in the net interest 
margin. FDI is not statistically significant in the high government bank ownership 
group, however, has a positive effect on private credit and the financial sector 
efficiency variables in the low government bank ownership group. Exchange rate 
controls and inflation influence the financial sector size and efficiency variables 
negatively. 
 
Robustness Tests 
Several tests are carried out to ensure the robustness of the results.  The study uses a 
number of alternative measures of financial development to check the robustness of 
the results to the measure of financial sector development. Financial sector size is 
proxied by three different variables: the ratio of deposit banks assets to GDP, liquid 
assets to GDP and domestic credit by deposit banks and other financial institutions to 
the private sector as a ratio of GDP. Financial sector efficiency is measured by two 
variables: the value of banks’ net interest margin to total assets, and banks’ overhead 
costs to total assets. The results are robust to the measure of financial sector 
development. 
 
Several additional control variables are used to check the robustness of the results to 
the conclusions of the study. These control variables which include, population 
growth, secondary schooling, government consumption, gross domestic capital 
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formation, religious fractionalisation and a conflict dummy variable do not change the 
overall conclusions of the study. 
 
System GMM is used in addition to OLS to ensure that the results are robust to the 
estimation procedure. The system GMM method allows correcting for the potential 
endogeneity of migrant remittances and other explanatory variables. It also permits 
the inclusion of time invariant regressors which would disappear in difference GMM. 
Two diagnostic tests are carried out on the system GMM estimates, a Sargan test for 
overidentifying restrictions and the Arellano-Bond test for second order serial 
correlation in the first-differenced residuals. The Sargan test and the serial correlation 
test confirm that the moments conditions cannot be rejected.   
 
The sample is further disaggregated by the government ownership of banks to confirm 
the finding that remittances have a stronger influence on financial sector size in 
countries with a lower government ownership of banks and a stronger impact on 
financial sector efficiency in countries with a higher government ownership of banks. 
The disaggregated models confirm the findings derived in  Table 6.  
 
6.    Conclusions 
 
This study examines the impact of migrant remittances on financial sector size and 
efficiency. The study also investigates the effect of remittances on financial sector 
size and efficiency through the government ownership of banks channel.  The results 
suggest that remittances lead to increases in the volume of credit disbursed, the 
volume of bank deposits and liquid assets in the banking sector consistent with the 
findings of Aggarwal et al.(2006), Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2009), Gupta et al. 
(2009). The results also suggest that remittances lead to a fall in overhead costs and 
net interest margins. The conclusion that remittances lead to an increases in deposits 
mobilised, credit disbursed and liquid assets is reasonable considering that  
remittances serve as an important means of providing financial access particularly to 
the rural poor. Remittances provide a means through which recipients can open 
accounts thereby improving the liquidity of the banking system and the availability of 
credit the public. The results also suggest that remittances permit banks to reduce 
overhead costs and net interest margins. In many low and middle income economies, 
the banking system subsidies loans providing the public with access to funds (see 
Detragiache et al. 2005). It is possible that remittance inflows permit banks to further 
subsidise loans and thereby have the potential to reduce overhead costs. The 
interaction terms on bank ownership x migrant remittances, and the government bank 
ownership disaggregated estimates, suggest that remittances lead to increases in the 
volume of deposits mobilised, credit disbursed and liquid assets in countries with a 
low government ownership of banks. Although remittances also lead to increases in 
financial sector size in countries with a high government ownership of banks, greater 
increases in financial sector size are experienced by the low government ownership 
group. A possible explanation for this perhaps is that countries with a lower presence 
of state banks offer higher interest rates on deposits attracting larger volumes of 
deposits. This in turn enables these banks to increase liquid assets and lending to the 
private sector. Privately owned banks could also provide customers with a wider 
range of financial services and instruments compared to government owned banks. 
The interaction terms and the estimates for the regressions disaggregated by the 
government ownership of banks also suggest that remittances lead to a fall in 
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overhead costs and net interest margins in countries with a high government bank 
ownership. A reason that net interest margins are low in countries with a high 
government ownership of banks is perhaps due to the subsidization of loans due to 
lending to priority sectors.  It is possible that remittance flows enable these banks to 
further subsidize lending giving rise to lower net interest margins and therefore 
overhead costs.  
 
The present study in addition, shows that income is an important factor explaining 
financial sector development. Evidence also shows that greater openness as measured 
primarily by the volume of exports to GDP, exchange rate relaxation and to some 
extent FDI, contribute to financial sector development. This is reasonable considering 
that increased openness could encourage increased transfers into remittance receiving 
countries and also increase the use of the formal sector for money transmission 
purposes. The results indicate that inflation has a negative impact on both financial 
sector size and efficiency. Inflation can discourage financial intermediation and  
increase risk thereby reducing remittance flows and financial sector development. 
There is also some evidence that secondary school enrolment and gross domestic 
capital formation are important for financial sector development suggesting that the 
level of financial literacy of a society and investment in infrastructure are important 
pre-requisites for financial sector development. The results indicate that religious 
fractionalisation contributes negatively to financial sector development. This is not 
surprising given that religious heterogeneity can slow down the process of financial 
development by promoting the interests of certain groups (see Beck et al. 2003). The 
results lend support to the argument that conflict contributes negatively to financial 
sector size, however, also contribute to reducing overhead costs and net interest 
margins.  The fall in the financial sector size variables are possibly due to the 
uncertainity and risk associated with conflict. It is also possible that borrowing falls 
during periods of conflict to which banks respond  by reducing net interest margins 
and overhead costs. 
 
In conclusion, the government ownership of banks is not detrimental to remittance 
receiving countries. In the developing economies, the government has a wider 
distribution of branches in rural areas, and it is the government that primarily provides 
the masses with access to cheap credit. Government ownership plays an important 
role in the present study by mobilising savings within a financial system. This is 
consistent with the development view according to which the government can help 
reduce market failures thereby promoting development through lower costs and 
increased access to finance. Given the evidence that remittances contribute positively 
to financial sector development, the governments of these economies should take 
measures to improve the range of money transmission services provided to migrants 
through formal channels. This would contribute not only to increasing the size and 
efficiency of the financial system but also bring a larger proportion of the ‘unbanked’ 
population into the ‘banked’ sector. While measures have been taken by several 
countries to introduce financial literacy programmes and improve the infrastructure 
necessary for the provision of financial services, it is important to ensure that these 
programmes are targeted to the masses increasing financial inclusiveness. Bank 
penetration needs to be increased by setting up more banks and/or increasing services 
such as access to branchless banking, for example mobile phone payment systems, 
targeting the unbanked.  
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Appendix 
Data  Sources and Description: 
- Ratio of Deposit Bank Assets/GDP, Domestic Credit by Deposit Banks and Other 
Financial Institutions/GDP, Liquid Assets/GDP, Banks Net Interest Margin/Total 
Assets, Banks’ Overhead Costs/Total Assets, Migrant Remittances % of GDP, annual 
data 1990-2007: from Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1999 updated in 2009) and 
World Development Indicators. 
- GDP per capita annual data 1990-2007: Purchasing Power Parity  from the World 
Development Indicators. 
- Migrant Remittances and Compensation of Employees Absolute Value US $ Million 
annual data 1990-2007– Current transfers by migrant workers, wages and salaries 
earned by non resident workers from Global Development Finance. 
-  Foreign Direct Investment annual data 1990-2007: World Development Indicators. 
-  Exports as % of GDP annual data 1990-2007: World Development Indicators. 
-  Exchange Rate Dummy Variable: Takes on a value of 1 if a country follows some 
form of fixed/managed/crawling peg exchange rate regime and a value of 0 is the 
currency of a country is allowed to float freely:  from Fischer S (2001). 
- Inflation (consumer price index) annual data 1990-2007: World Development 
Indicators. 
- Government Consumption/GDP annual data 1990-2007: World Development 
Indicators. 
- Government Ownership of Banks: Share of the top 10 banks in a country owned by 
the government of that country in 1995 from La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes and Shleifer 
(2002); and the fraction of deposits held by the five largest banks from Barth, Caprio 
and Levine (2001). 
-  Legal origin from La Porta, Lopez-DeSilanes and Shleifer (1997) and Harper and 
Mc Nulty (2008). A dummy variable of one is assigned for French legal origin and 
zero otherwise. 
- Gross Domestic Capital Formation/GDP annual data 1990-2007: World 
Development Indicators. 
- Net Secondary Enrolment Ratio annual data 1990-2007: World Development 
Indicators. 
-  Conflict Dummy Variable: takes on a value of 1 if a country experienced a conflict 
during the period under study, and zero otherwise. From the Encyclopedia of  
Conflicts Since World War II edited by Ciment J (2006). 
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-  Religious fractionalisation 2001: from Alesina A, Devleeschauwer A, Easterly W, 
Kurlat S and Wacziarg R (2003).  
-  Population growth rate annual data 1990-2007: World Development Indicators. 
 
Countries in the Sample 
Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belarus, Benin, 
Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, 
Chad, Chile, China, Cambodia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Cuba, 
Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Georgia, 
Ghana, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Jamaica, Jordan, 
Kazakhstan, Kenya, Lao, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Lithuania, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, 
Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, 
Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia, 
Samoa, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, 
Suriname, Swaziland, Syria, Thailand, Togo, Tonga, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, 
Ukraine, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.  
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Table 1: The Government Ownership of Banks, Financial Sector Development 
and Migrant Remittances 
Country 
 
 
 
 
Government 
Ownership 
of Banksa 
 
 
Deposit 
Bank 
Assets/GDPb
 
 
Liquid 
Liabilities 
/GDPb 
 
 
Private 
Credit 
/GDPb 
 
 
Overhead 
Costsb 
 
 
 
Net 
Interest 
Marginb 
 
 
Remittances 
US $ 
Millionc 
 
 
Remittances/
GDPc 
 
 
 
China 1.040   1.140 0.011 0.024 7499.750 0.434
Iran 1.000 0.257 0.517 0.300 0.017 0.044 1056.000 0.714
Algeria 0.990 0.320 0.478 0.480 0.016 0.046 1053.000 1.734
Viet Nam 0.990 0.652  0.660 0.013 0.028 4000.000 7.821
Bangladesh 0.950 0.255 0.274 0.165 0.023 0.007 2050.000 4.094
Costa Rica 0.910 0.191 0.375 0.171 0.065 0.052 67.750 0.541
Bulgaria 0.860 0.436   0.037 0.044 547.000 0.466
India 0.850 0.324 0.416 0.268 0.029 0.030 11328.000 2.088
Pakistan 0.850 0.341 0.397 0.234 0.030 0.029 2268.250 3.266
Poland 0.840 0.393 0.418 0.277 0.038 0.043 1499.750 0.918
Maldives 0.750      2.250 0.575
Slovakia 0.740   0.440 0.028 0.023 123.000 0.389
Sri Lanka 0.710 0.258 0.359 0.191 0.047 0.051 1116.000 7.001
Moldova 0.700  0.365 0.208 0.052 0.058 366.667 10.451
Belarus 0.670   0.220 0.048 0.050 179.333 0.852
Burundi 0.630 0.035 0.040 0.200 0.332 0.512 0.000 0.000
Nicaragua 0.630   0.250 0.046 0.047 331.667 5.937
Romania 0.630 0.184 0.297 0.150 0.052 0.053 1209.500 1.711
Venezuela 0.570 0.235 0.448 0.387 0.067 0.078 42.000 0.032
Jamaica 0.560 0.328 0.455 0.280 0.076 0.091 889.250 12.184
Kazakhstan 0.560 0.296 0.241 0.150 0.034 0.046 138.667 0.407
Tajikistan 0.560   0.140   0.000 0.000
Colombia 0.530 0.155 0.265 0.272 0.083 0.064 1566.500 1.759
Lesotho 0.510 0.274 0.442 0.162 0.046 0.035 354.500 28.697
Average High 
Govt. Bank 
Ownership 
(> 50 %) 0.751 0.290 0.362 0.307 0.054 0.066 1570.368 3.836
Paraguay 0.480 0.121 0.207 0.162 0.064 0.065 216.750 2.931
Lithuania 0.440 0.375 0.360 0.328 0.025 0.026 195.000 0.644
Indonesia 0.430 0.301 0.274 0.262 0.029 0.041 669.000 0.419
Ecuador 0.400 0.152 0.210 0.189 0.077 0.072 1265.667 4.390
Dominican 
Republic 0.390 0.172 0.225 0.253 0.065 0.063 1427.500 7.861
Ghana 0.380 0.052 0.142 0.032 0.055 0.071 77.000 0.493
Morocco 0.380 0.279 0.542 0.258 0.027 0.036 2681.500 7.475
Tunisia 0.370 0.569 0.478 0.565 0.019 0.022 855.000 4.505
Mexico 0.360 0.192 0.234 0.176 0.050 0.053 9190.750 1.757
Turkey 0.350 0.186 0.218 0.138 0.064 0.094 2996.000 1.645
Brazil 0.320 0.242 0.193 0.247 0.120 0.120 2269.250 0.337
Russian 
Federation 0.320 0.268 0.297 0.227 0.040 0.040 2298.333 0.390
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Country 
 
 
 
 
Government 
Ownership 
of Banksa 
 
 
Deposit 
Bank 
Assets/GDPb
 
 
Liquid 
Liabilities 
/GDPb 
 
 
Private 
Credit 
/GDPb 
 
 
Overhead 
Costsb 
 
 
 
Net 
Interest 
Marginb 
 
 
Remittances 
US $ 
Millionc 
 
 
Remittances/
GDPc 
 
 
 
Zimbabwe 0.300 0.211 0.395 0.219 0.039 0.044 1.000 0.012
Kenya 0.290 0.247 0.404 0.291 0.037 0.073 374.750 3.049
Senegal 0.280 0.327 0.251 0.310 0.067 0.050 289.750 4.819
Philippines 0.270 0.294 0.331 0.294 0.051 0.042 6650.750 7.686
El Salvador 0.260 0.248 0.312 0.236 0.033 0.039 1509.250 13.446
Jordan 0.260 0.656 0.656 0.258 0.027 0.036 1571.250 18.945
Peru 0.260 0.101 0.146 0.098 0.105 0.072 711.000 1.209
Ukraine 0.260   0.330 0.048 0.049 314.000 0.418
Zambia 0.230 0.001 0.010 0.070 0.541 0.420 0.000 0.000
Guatemala 0.220 0.154 0.229 0.151 0.061 0.054 3324.250 13.624
Botswana 0.200 0.123 0.256 0.113 0.055 0.052 74.000 1.332
Nepal 0.200 0.167 0.280 0.111 0.025 0.037 459.667 4.913
Guyana 0.190 0.638 0.837 0.297 0.039 0.044 76.667 10.548
Panama 0.170 0.536 0.442 0.508 0.016 0.020 91.000 1.172
Thailand 0.170 0.575 0.607 0.682 0.020 0.030 1388.000 1.068
Nigeria 0.130 0.188 0.272 0.147 0.078 0.047 1383.750 2.610
Malaysia 0.100 0.678 0.921 0.797 0.016 0.025 825.750 0.959
Vanuatu 0.100 0.450 0.963 0.428   17.000 7.457
Lebanon 0.070 0.440 0.500 0.840 0.017 0.027 2387.250 23.692
Trinidad 
&Tobago 0.020 0.372 0.512 0.498 0.045 0.037 40.000 0.465
Samoa 0.000 0.380 0.411 0.362   43.333 16.774
South Africa 0.000 0.564 0.455 0.788 0.036 0.039 369.000 0.303
Tonga 0.000 0.578 0.514 0.536   45.000 33.268
Average Low 
Govt. Bank 
Ownership 
(< 50%) 0.246 0.319 0.385 0.320 0.057 0.057 1316.805 5.732
a- Government ownership of banks from La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes and Shleifer (2002) and Barth, 
Caprio Jr and  Levine(2001). 
b – All financial sector variables and migrant remittances as % of GDP are from Beck, Demirguc-Kunt 
and Levine (1999 updated in 2009) and World Development Indicators. 
c - Data on remittances absolute value in US $ million  from Global Development Finance, World 
Bank. 
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       Table 2:  Migrant Remittances and Financial Sector Size and Efficiency:  
 
       OLS Estimation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
 
Independent Variables 
Deposit 
Money Bank 
Assets/ 
GDP 
Private 
Credit/GDP 
Liquid 
Assets/GDP 
Overhead 
Costs 
Net Interest 
Margin 
Log GDP Per Capita  0.033 
(0.080)*** 
 0.048 
(0.010)*** 
 0.072 
(0.018)*** 
-0.003 
(0.001)** 
-0.005 
(0.001)*** 
Remittances 0.039 
(0.003)*** 
0.025 
(0.003)* 
0.024 
(0.005)*** 
- 0.003 
(0.0005)*** 
 -0.004 
(0.0006)*** 
Exports 0.136 
(0.019)*** 
0.144 
(0.019)*** 
0.141 
(0.017)*** 
-0.009 
(0.002)*** 
-0.015 
(0.002)*** 
FDI  0.005 
(0.004) 
 0.010 
(0.005)* 
 0.011 
(0.004)** 
-0.004 
(0.0007)*** 
- 0.003 
(0.0008)*** 
Inflation -0.059 
(0.006)*** 
-0.054 
(0.007)*** 
-0.070 
(0.007)*** 
0.011 
(0.0008)*** 
0.014 
(0.001)*** 
Exchange Rate 
Regime Dummy 
- 0.035 
(0.018)*** 
-0.007 
(0.034) 
- 0.063 
(0.018)*** 
 0.004 
(0.003) 
  0.006 
(0.003)* 
Intercept  0.516 
(0.075)*** 
 0.615 
(0.076)*** 
 0.056 
(0.154) 
 0.060 
(0.011)*** 
0.075 
(0.012)*** 
R2 0.36 0.28 0.30 0.29 0.39 
Observations 831 830 832 719 711 
Note:  Robust standard errors clustered by region reported in parenthesis.  ***,  **,  *, significant at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
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Table 3:  Migrant Remittances and  Financial Sector Size and Efficiency with 
Additional Control Variables:  OLS Estimation 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Independent 
Variables 
Deposit 
Money Bank 
Assets/ 
GDP 
Private 
Credit/GDP 
Liquid 
Assets/GDP 
Overhead 
Costs 
Net Interest 
Margin 
Log  GDP Per 
Capita 
 0.048 
(0.010)*** 
0.083 
(0.036)*** 
0.060 
(0.029)** 
-0.008 
(0.003)*** 
-0.018 
(0.003)*** 
Remittances 0.041 
(0.008)*** 
0.028 
(0.008)*** 
0.021 
(0.007)*** 
 -0.003 
(0.001)** 
-0.003 
(0.001)** 
French Legal Origin 
Dummy 
-0.012 
(0.039) 
-0.060 
(0.037)* 
-0.042 
(0.044) 
0.023 
(0.004)*** 
 0.030 
(0.004)*** 
Exports  0.144 
(0.030)*** 
 0.163 
(0.028)*** 
0.166 
(0.025)*** 
-0.009 
(0.002)*** 
-0.017 
(0.003)*** 
FDI 0.019 
(0.014) 
 0.002 
(0.016) 
 0.030 
(0.016)* 
0.002 
(0.008) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
Exchange Rate 
Dummy 
 -0.084 
(0.038)** 
 -0.030 
(0.052)** 
-0.159 
(0.045)*** 
 0.018 
(0.005)*** 
 0.017 
(0.006)*** 
Inflation -0.084 
(0.012)*** 
-0.088 
(0.013)*** 
-0.102 
(0.014)*** 
 0.009 
(0.001)*** 
0.012 
(0.002)*** 
Population growth   0.103 
(0.034)*** 
 0.128 
(0.041)*** 
 0.089 
(0.038)** 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
0.007 
(0.003)* 
Secondary 
Schooling 
 0.095 
(0.030)*** 
 0.051 
(0.030)* 
 0.128 
(0.003)*** 
-0.014 
(0.004)*** 
-0.011 
(0.003)*** 
Govt. Consumption  0.009 
(0.039) 
-0.018 
(0.036) 
 0.068 
(0.040)* 
0.008 
(0.004)** 
 0.005 
(0.004) 
Gross Domestic 
Capital Formation 
 0.067 
(0.052) 
 0.094 
(0.059) 
 0.043 
(0.057) 
-0.020 
(0.006)*** 
0.004 
(0.009) 
Religious 
Fractionalisation 
-0.221 
(0.084)*** 
-0.229 
(0.105)** 
-0.097 
(0.081) 
0.012 
(0.008) 
0.047 
(0.010)*** 
Conflict Dummy -0.084 
(0.026)*** 
0.042 
(0.031) 
-0.071 
(0.026)*** 
-0.006 
(0.003)* 
-0.006 
(0.003)* 
Intercept  0.008 
(0.642) 
0.531 
(0.546) 
 0.706 
(0.722) 
0.248 
(0.019)*** 
 0.114 
(0.087) 
R2 0.53 0.51 0.52 0.48 0.46 
Observations 252 252 252 246 245 
Note:  Robust standard errors clustered by region reported in parenthesis.  ***,  **,  *, significant at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
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Table 4:  Migrant Remittances and Financial Sector Size and Efficiency:  System 
GMM Estimation 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Independent 
Variables 
Deposit 
Money Bank 
Assets/ 
GDP 
Private 
Credit/GDP 
Liquid 
Assets/GDP 
Overhead 
Costs 
Net Interest 
Margin 
Log  GDP Per 
Capita 
0.124 
(0.037)*** 
0.125 
(0.011)*** 
0.043 
(0.009)*** 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.013 
(0.009)*** 
Remittances 0.008 
(0.002)*** 
0.004 
(0.002)** 
0.010 
(0.002)*** 
-0.002 
(0.001)** 
-0.004 
(0.001)*** 
Exports 0.090 
(0.040)** 
0.069 
(0.010)*** 
0.034 
(0.009)*** 
-0.006 
(0.004) 
-0.013 
(0.004)*** 
FDI 0.001 
(0.003) 
 0.003 
(0.001)*** 
 0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.0001)* 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
Exchange Rate 
Dummy 
-0.107 
(0.039)*** 
-0.065 
(0.040)* 
-0.002 
(0.031) 
 0.048 
(0.017)*** 
 0.022 
(0.028) 
Inflation -0.010 
(0.001)*** 
-0.011 
(0.001)*** 
-0.003 
(0.001)* 
0.001 
(0.0008)* 
0.003 
(0.0009)*** 
Lag of Dependent 
Variable 
0.947 
(0.030)*** 
0.974 
(0.011)*** 
0.976 
(0.021)*** 
0.526 
(0.034)*** 
0.394 
(0.038)*** 
Intercept 0.842 
(0.294)*** 
0.835 
(0.099)*** 
 0.282 
(0.074)*** 
 0.023 
(0.029) 
-0.415 
(0.219)** 
Sargan Test for 
over-identifying 
restriction: p value 
 
0.14 
 
0.15 
 
0.15 
 
0.16 
 
0.16 
2nd Order 
Autocorrelation: p 
value 
 
0.13 
 
0.13 
 
0.14 
 
0.14 
 
0.15 
 
Observations 782 781 784 669 660 
Note:  Standard errors reported in parenthesis.  ***,  **,  *, significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
respectively.  The difference equation is instrumented with the lagged levels, two periods, of the 
dependent variable and the levels equation with the difference lagged one period. Time specific fixed 
effects are included as regressors.  
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Table 5:  Migrant Remittances and  Financial Sector Size and Efficiency with 
Additional Control Variables:  System GMM  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Independent 
Variables 
Deposit 
Money Bank 
Assets/ 
GDP 
Private 
Credit/GDP 
Liquid 
Assets/GDP 
Overhead 
Costs 
Net Interest 
Margin 
Log  GDP Per 
Capita 
 0.024 
(0.014)* 
0.026 
(0.018)* 
0.045 
(0.016)*** 
-0.006 
(0.001)*** 
-0.007 
(0.004)* 
Remittances 0.023 
(0.010)** 
0.021 
(0.008)*** 
0.019 
(0.005)*** 
 -0.003 
(0.001)** 
-0.009 
(0.003)*** 
French Legal Origin 
Dummy 
-0.068 
(0.038)* 
-0.122 
(0.055)** 
-0.011 
(0.035) 
0.131 
(0.025)*** 
 0.045 
(0.076) 
Exports  0.117 
(0.046)*** 
 0.039 
(0.020)** 
0.026 
(0.014)* 
-0.005 
(0.008) 
-0.008 
(0.010) 
FDI 0.010 
(0.008) 
 0.002 
(0.003) 
 0.009 
(0.003)*** 
0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.002 
(0.001)** 
Exchange Rate 
Dummy 
 -0.457 
(0.095)** 
 -0.239 
(0.045)*** 
-0.081 
(0.045)* 
 0.040 
(0.032) 
 0.017 
(0.060) 
Inflation -0.025 
(0.008)*** 
-0.009 
(0.003)** 
-0.005 
(0.003) 
 0.001 
(0.001) 
0.003 
(0.001)* 
Population growth   0.019 
(0.013) 
 0.005 
(0.006) 
 0.002 
(0.006) 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
0.003 
(0.003) 
Secondary 
Schooling 
 0.051 
(0.022)** 
 0.007 
(0.023) 
 0.021 
(0.012)* 
-0.009 
(0.004)** 
-0.013 
(0.011) 
Govt. Consumption  0.050 
(0.056) 
-0.002 
(0.027) 
 0.001 
(0.021) 
0.014 
(0.013) 
 0.010 
(0.012) 
Gross Domestic 
Capital Formation 
 0.168 
(0.047)*** 
 0.045 
(0.022)** 
 0.019 
(0.019) 
-0.029 
(0.010)*** 
-0.009 
(0.016) 
Religious 
Fractionalisation 
-0.165 
(0.242) 
-0.011 
(0.176) 
-0.311 
(0.096)*** 
0.089 
(0.033)*** 
0.110 
(0.146) 
Conflict Dummy -0.183 
(0.075)*** 
0.019 
(0.013) 
-0.001 
(0.035) 
-0.004 
(0.015) 
-0.031 
(0.015)* 
Lag of Dependent 
Variable 
0.877 
(0.040)*** 
0.781 
(0.043)*** 
0.894 
(0.042)*** 
0.214 
(0.068)*** 
0.229 
(0.125)* 
Intercept  0.875 
(0.505)* 
0.225 
(0.206) 
 0.440 
(0.146)*** 
0.010 
(0.078) 
 0.106 
(0.187) 
Sargan Test for 
over-identifying 
restriction: p value 
0.15 0.14 0.15 0.13 0.16 
Arellano-Bond Test 
for 2nd Order 
Autocorrelation: p 
value 
0.21 0.22 0.75 0.58 0.15 
Observations 252 252 252 246 240 
Note:  Standard errors reported in parenthesis.  ***,  **,  *, significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
respectively. The difference equation is instrumented with the lagged levels, two periods, of the 
dependent variable and the levels equation with the difference lagged one period. Time specific fixed 
effects are included as regressors.  
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Table 6: Bank Ownership, Migrant Remittances and Financial Sector 
Development: System GMM 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Independent 
Variables 
Deposit 
Money Bank 
Assets/ 
GDP 
Private 
Credit/GDP 
Liquid 
Assets/GDP 
Overhead 
Costs 
Net Interest 
Margin 
Log  GDP Per 
Capita 
0.168 
(0.065)*** 
0.250 
(0.037)*** 
0.052 
(0.028)* 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
-0.008 
(0.016) 
Remittances 0.036 
(0.010)*** 
0.024 
(0.010)*** 
0.019 
(0.010)* 
 -0.002 
(0.001)* 
-0.006 
(0.002)** 
Exports 0.208 
(0.053)*** 
0.151 
(0.039)*** 
0.102 
(0.040)*** 
-0.004 
(0.005) 
-0.010 
(0.005)* 
FDI 0.004 
(0.007) 
0.029 
(0.009)*** 
0.001 
(0.005) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.002 
(0.0008)*** 
Exchange Rate 
Dummy 
-0.447 
(0.191)** 
-0.373 
(0.097)*** 
-0.522 
(0.368) 
0.030 
(0.02) 
 0.019 
(0.027) 
Inflation -0.007 
(0.013) 
-0.018 
(0.008)*** 
-0.007 
(0.007) 
0.002 
(0.001)* 
0.003 
(0.001)** 
Government  
Ownership* 
Remittances 
-0.003 
(0.0009)*** 
-0.002 
(0.001)* 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.005 
(0.003)* 
-0.019 
(0.010)* 
Intercept 0.222 
0.620) 
0.367 
(0.312) 
1.83 
(0.923) 
0.032 
(0.049) 
0.016 
(0.110) 
Lag of Dependent 
Variable 
0.997 
(0.055)*** 
0.845 
(0.026)*** 
0.933 
(0.035)*** 
0.523 
(0.098)*** 
0.389 
(0.075)*** 
Sargan Test for 
over-identifying 
restriction: p value 
0.12 0.16 0.17 0.15 0.14 
Arellano-Bond Test 
for 2nd Order 
Autocorrelation: p 
value 
0.14 0.13 0.15 0.14 0.14 
Observations 611 608 614 563 559 
Note: Standard errors reported in parenthesis.  ***,  **,  *, significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
respectively. The difference equation is instrumented with the lagged levels, two periods, of the 
dependent variable and the levels equation with the difference lagged one period. Time specific fixed 
effects are included as regressors.  
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Table 7: Bank Ownership, Migrant Remittances and Financial Sector 
Development Disaggregated by Government Ownership of Banks: System GMM 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
High Government Bank Ownership Group 
Independent Variables Deposit Money 
Bank Assets/ 
GDP 
Private 
Credit/GDP 
Liquid 
Assets/GDP 
Overhead Costs Net Interest 
Margin 
Log  GDP Per Capita 0.150 
(0.040)*** 
0.206 
(0.028)*** 
0.059 
(0.029)** 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.003 
(0.005) 
Remittances 0.015 
(0.008)* 
0.020 
(0.008)*** 
0.006 
(0.006) 
 -0.003 
(0.001)*** 
-0.004 
(0.001)*** 
Exports 0.194 
(0.032)*** 
0.154 
(0.029)*** 
0.108 
(0.024)*** 
-0.007 
(0.005) 
-0.017 
(0.006)*** 
FDI 0.004 
(0.006) 
0.005 
(0.006) 
0.002 
(0.005) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.0001) 
Exchange Rate 
Dummy 
-0.401 
(0.087)*** 
-0.333 
(0.078)*** 
-0.031 
(0.098) 
0.029 
(0.019) 
 0.001 
(0.015) 
Inflation -0.007 
(0.006) 
-0.007 
(0.006) 
-0.010 
(0.004)** 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.006 
(0.001)*** 
Lag of Dependent 
Variable 
0.882 
(0.030)*** 
0.860 
(0.028)*** 
0.853 
(0.031)*** 
0.306 
(0.054)*** 
0.457 
(0.053)*** 
Intercept 0.709 
(0.326)** 
0.845 
(0.026)*** 
0.222 
(0.259) 
0.063 
(0.031)** 
0.074 
(0.035)** 
Sargan Test for over-
identifying restriction: 
p value 
0.15 0.16 0.18 0.13 0.12 
Arellano-Bond Test for 
2nd Order 
Autocorrelation: p 
value 
0.14 0.013 0.15 0.18 0.20 
Observations 400 403 403 356 352 
Low Government Bank Ownership Group 
 Deposit Money 
Bank Assets/ 
GDP 
Private 
Credit/GDP 
Liquid 
Assets/GDP 
Overhead Costs Net Interest 
Margin 
Log  GDP Per Capita 0.113 
(0.024)*** 
0.044 
(0.033) 
0.097 
(0.024)*** 
-0.015 
(0.006)** 
-0.002 
(0.005) 
Remittances 0.032 
(0.008)*** 
0.048 
(0.011)*** 
0.017 
(0.006)*** 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
Exports 0.082 
(0.035)*** 
0.095 
(0.044)** 
0.062 
(0.025)*** 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
-0.014 
(0.005)*** 
FDI 0.002 
(0.006) 
0.037 
(0.005)*** 
0.003 
(0.005) 
-0.002 
(0.001)* 
-0.002 
(0.001)** 
Exchange Rate 
Dummy 
-0.114 
(0.083) 
-0.564 
(0.154)*** 
-0.280 
(0.070)*** 
0.012 
(0.011) 
0.005 
(0.015) 
Inflation -0.027 
(0.007)*** 
-0.035 
(0.009)*** 
-0.003 
(0.005) 
0.003 
(0.001)*** 
0.002 
(0.001)*** 
Lag of Dependent 
Variable 
0.951 
(0.027)*** 
0.967 
(0.029)*** 
0.897 
(0.030)*** 
0.614 
(0.034)*** 
0.399 
(0.043)*** 
Intercept 0.406 
(0.324) 
0.175 
(0.368) 
0.546 
(0.181)*** 
0.125 
(0.050)*** 
0.120 
(0.046)*** 
Sargan Test for over-
identifying restriction: 
p value 
0.16 0.17 0.16 0.12 0.13 
Arellano-Bond Test for 
2nd Order 
Autocorrelation: p 
value 
0.17 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.15 
Observations 382 378 381 313 308 
Note:  Standard errors reported in parenthesis.  ***,  **,  *, significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
respectively.  The difference equation is instrumented with the lagged levels, two periods, of the 
dependent variable and the levels equation with the difference lagged one period. Time specific fixed 
effects are included as regressors.  
 
 
